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The tremendous pressure to keep abreast of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida has somewhat abated during the past two months, reflecting
delays incident to the court's removal to new quarters.' The output continues
large, however, with the greatest emphasis, following the usual pattern, upon
questions of practice, and the principal content upon questions of public law.
In order to meet the publication date for this issue, we have been forced to
confine our comments to questions of public law.
PUBLIc LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Economic freedom. A recent decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, not yet published, has received such widespread
attention,2 that we report it, departing from our general policy. The Supreme
Court has held unconstitutional the Florida Fair Trade Law s in an action
brought by a manufacturer to enjoin the sale of liquor below the retail price
established in a contract to which the retailer was not a party.4 The Fair Trade
Law purports to legalize contracts which fix the resale price of commodities
sold by brand, trademark, or name of the manufacturer or distributor, and to
authorize an action against any person willfully advertising, offering, or selling
any such commodity below the stipulated price, even when that person is not
a party to, or the goods offered for sale are not covered by, such a contract.
The case has been widely heralded as the first sign of a judicial reawakening,
following the unsettling effects of long depression and war, to the responsibility
to protect, under classical principles of American constitutional law, the
natural and inalienable rights of the individual, nbt the least of which is the
freedom of the market place.5
Prior to the long depression, it was generally held that any legislation
placing restraints on the freedom of trade and contract Was unconstitutional.
The only exception was made in the case of public utilities, where monopolistic
practices were tolerated in the interest of efficiency, and price control was used
to insure the benefits of this efficiency to the consuming public. 6 The fixing of
1. The cases covered in this'issue are found in the advance sheets beginning March
3, 1949, and ending with April 28, 1949 (38 So.2d 457 through 39 So,2d 557). The actual
decision dates run from February 1, 1949 through March 25, 1949.
2. See Time, April 18, 1949, p. 91, col. 2.
3. FLA. STATS. §§ 541.01-08 (1941).
4. Liquor Stores v. Continental Distilling Corp., January Term, 1949; opinion filed
5 April, 1949. Petition for rehearing was pending when this note was written.
5. See Holman, Our American Heritage, 22 FL,k. L. 3. 153 (May, 1949).
6. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
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minimum prices was found to be inconsistent with this philosophy until, during
the depression, ruinous competition threatened to destroy production and
distribution of commodities essential to the support of life, particularly the
distribution of milk.7 In the initial cases, the public interest in maintaining
the particular activity was emphasized; but this factor seems to have slipped
from notice in subsequent cases.8 Fair trade laws, which permit price fixing
regardless of the type of the commodity, have been upheld against attack
under the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Supreme Court of Florida is now
back upon firmer ground, demanding that a public interest in the industry
protected be shown, and, in effect, distinguishing between the distribution of
milk and the distribution of spirits.
Various reasons are assigned by the several judges who filed concurring
opinions, not the least of which is that there has been an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to private interests; 10 but the prevailing opinion
centers upon the principle that where the sovereign power of the state is
asserted to regulate, as well as where it is asserted to tax or to requisition
private property, it must be for a public purpose. What burdens the public
for the benefit of private interests, whose business is not otherwise affected
with a public interest, transgresses constitutional limitations. Nothing in
the opinion can be construed as a limitation upon the power of the legislature to
prevent unfair competition, as that term is generally understood."
Imprisonment for debt: contempt to compel payment of alimony. The
Constitution of Florida forbids imprisonment for debt, except in cases of
fraud. - An appeal was made to the constitution to avoid a decree, entered
in proceedings subsequent to divorce, authorizing execution to issue for
arrears in alimony and directirug the husband to be committed thirty days
for wilful failure to comply with the orders of court.' 3 The supreme court
noticed the problem, but found it unnecessary to make a decision thereon. A
decree awarding alimony is not a final decree upon which process may issue.
It is necessary either to obtain a decree for arrears, and to issue execution
thereon,14 or to have recourse to civil contempt proceedings to enforce corn-
7. Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
8. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941).
9. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
10. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), disapproving
the delegation of power to make codes of fair competition to trade associations; but
deciding the case oi other grounds.
11. " 'Unfair competition' as known to the common law is a limited concept. . . . In
recent years, its scope has been extended. . . . Unfairness in competition has been
predicated of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of business -and are tainted by
fraud or coercion or conduct otherwise prohibited by law." Hughes, C. J., in Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 531 (1935).
12. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 16.
13. Satterfield v. Satterfield, 39 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1949). The court found that the
refusal to pay alimony was not willful, and on that ground remitted the imprisonment.
14. Whether or not this is original process, see Peacock v. Peacock, 36 So.21 206
(Fla. 1948), noted in Synopsis. 2 MIAmI L. Q. 334 (1948).
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pliance. It has already been decided that civil contempt proceedings to enforce
payment of alimony do not violate the prohibition against imprisonment for
debt. 15 It is the combination of both that evokes challenge. The appellate court
used unfortunate language, drawn from criminal contempt cases, to the effect
that the term of imprisonment must be definite and certain; but this is not in
accord with the Chancery Procedure Law which provides for commitment
until the order is complied with.'6 The difficulty stems from the order of the
trial court, which failed to note the basic distinction between enforcement of
the alimony decree by civil contempt proceedings and punishment for
disobedience of the order by criminal contempt proceedings.
EMINENT DOMAIN. Excessive condemnation. There are two constitu-
tional limitations upon the pov~er of the state to requisition private property:
first, that the taking must be for a public purpose; and, second, that adequate
compensation must be paid. Both limitations present judicial questions. Ex-
cessive condemnation, that is the taking of more property than is reasonably
necessary for an approved public purpose, is one aspect of the first limitation.
This question has been noticed previously in discussing the power of the
state to condemn a fee and not a mere easement for purposes of a highway,
and whether the fee may be an absolute one, permitting the condemning agency
to dispose of the property by sale, or must be determinable. 7 In a current
case, the court has discussed another aspect, the taking of a greater area than
is necessary for the purpose for which the land is condemned.18 The city
condemned property as a site for an electric power plant, taking 36 acres,
obviously a generous slice. The owner in his answer claimed that this was
excessive, but failed to allege fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of such allegations, the owner was
not entitled to be heard on the issue of excessivetaking. The rule thus evolved
is that unless the corporation acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its
discretion as to the amount required is not subject to judicial control. The
opinion by Terrell, J., does not seem to be in harmony with that of Adams,
J., in the so-called Fair Trade Law case, where it is said: "This court has,
perhaps more so than many others, been alert to any trespass upon the citizen's
constitutional rights.""
15. Bronk v. State, 43 Fla. 461; 31 So. 248 (1901) ; State v. Stone, 137 Fla. 498,
188 So. 575 (1939). These cases state that the claim is not one ex contractu, and-therefore
not within the prohibition; but civil contempt proceedinfs generally are not prohibited.
Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 123 So. 3 (1929).
16. FLA. STATS. § 63.67 (1941). The court cited Avery v. Sinclair, 153 Fla. 767, 15
So2d 846 (1943), which recognizes the distinction between a contempt order predicated
on past noncompliance and one for present refusal to comply,
17. See J. M. Flowers, Florida Real Property Laws of 1947, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 21, 27
(1947), discussing a statute increasing the title of the State Road Department and the
several counties to public roads from a mere easement to a fie. (Fla. Laws of 1947, c.
23935).
18. Inland Waterway Development Co. v. Jacksonville, 38 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1948).
For other aspects of the same case, see 37 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1948), noted supra, p. 281.
19. Liquor Stores v. Continental Distilling Corp., not yet reported; see supro, note 4.
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Miscellaneous rulings. Other rulings from the principal case 20 are to
the effect that, since the court takes judicial notice of state statutes, the specific
statutory authority of a municipal corporation to condemn land need not be
pleaded. On the issue of damages, fees paid expert witnesses who testified as
to the value of the land for ihe owner, are not to be paid by the condemning
authority. It was held in another case 2] that where a municipality has actually
taken property without condemnation proceedings, the right to compensation
may be asserted by way of counterclaim in an action to foreclose tax liens,
or by injunction to prevent foreclosure.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Judicial review of action by civil service board.
The power of a city manager to discharge a policeman in disregard of the
findings and recommendations of a civil service board, was examined in a
recent case. 2 The city manager, who was also director of public safety, referred
charges to the civil service board and testified himself against the employee,
a lieutenant of police. The board found, by a majority vote, that the charges
were unfounded, and unanimously recommended reinstatement. The city
manager rejected the report, found the officer guilty of some of the charges,
and dismissed him. The case was brought into the circuit court by application
for mandamus, which was granted. The Supreme Court held that since the
findings of the board were supported 'by evidence, the city manager erred in
substituting his own. 5
The Supreme Court assumed that the city manager had power to review
the report of the board, and did not review the statutes to determine whether
or not that was so. In our opinion, the court overlooked the question properly
before it, as it is well settled that courts do not have power to review the
exercise of administrative discretion on a writ of mandamus. 2 4 It is not
likely that the legislature intended to vest such power in the city manager.
The rule of constitutional law, which holds unconstitutional any legislative
interference with the power of the chief executive to discharge employees for
whose conduct hp is responsible,26 has no application in the field of municipal
corporations. As to the chief executive, it is based upon the separation of
powers found in the constitution; but if the legislature, having plenary power
to organize the government of municipalities, choses to rearrange and redis-
tribute the powers of governmental agencies, there is no constitutional limita-
20. Inland Waterway Development Co. v. Jacksonville, 38 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1948).
21. Baylen Street Wharf Co. v. Pensacola, 39 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1949). The court
directed the case to proceed in the suit to enjoin the foreclosure, and did not specifically
reverse the order striking the counterclaim in the foreclosure case.
22. Miami v. Huttoe, 38 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1949).
23. This is placed upon the principle that the person who has before him the witnesses
is in a better position to evaluate their testimony than the reviewing authority. The
rle is not always followed. See Lester Harris, Appeals in Workmen's Compensation
Cases. 2 MAhsu L. Q. 215 (1948).
24. See Comment, Judicial Revew of Administrative Action in FIorida-Manda.;mus
2 MIAI L. Q. 233 (1948).
25. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
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tion upon which objection may be founded. The result in the particular case
was probably correct, but not for the reasons assigned.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs. Disannexation and dissolution. The inclusion
of unimproved land in a municipal corporation which is not benefited im-
mediately or prospectively thereby, is a taking of private property for public
use without compensation. It is therefore possible to effect the exclusion of
any such land by judicial proceedings without express statutory authority,
according to a case reviewed last quarter.26 Since the courts proceed upon the
theory that the legislature has exceeded constitutional limitations and that
therefore the act is void ab initio as to the excluded property, the actual or
prospective benefits must be judged in the circumstances which existed when
the act was passed. It is therefore erroneous to admit evidence showing that
benefits were actually received at a subsequent date, according to a recent
case.27 It is also apparent, according to the same case, that the power is not
limited to excluding marginal tracts, but may be used to void the entire
corporation.28
The Constitution of Florida forbids the abolition of municipal corpora-
tions without providing for the protection of creditors.29 This clause, of
course, has no application to judicial exclusion since it proceeds upon the
theory that there has never been a corporation, or that the particular land
was never included therein. The current decisions indicate several ways in
which protection may be afforded creditors notwithstanding this difficulty.
Where prompt action has not been taken, creditors may acquire rights by
estoppel, 30 bona fide purchasers for value without notice may be entitled to
protection, 1 and by recognizing the corporation as having de facto, if not de
jure, existence, claims may be enforced. 2 When a corporation has been
unconstitutionally created, it may nevertheless contract indebtedness, collect
and expend public funds before there is. a judicial determination of the
26. Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Watson, 38 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1948), noted srpro, p. 434.
27. Allen v. Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949). It would seem, however, that evidence
of actual benefits received is some evidence to show that the land was reasonably
susceptible of receiving benefit.
28. But see, apparently contra, Brann v. Ocean Ridge, 38 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1949).
The case was affirmed without opinion, but from the dissenting opinion of Terrell, J.,
the lands embraced, which were the heart of the town, were remote, wild, unoccupied,
unimproved, not susceptible of municipal benefits. A bill to restrain collection of taxes by
owners 6f such land was dismissed on motion.
29. FLA. CoNsr. Art. VIII, § &
30. See Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Watson, 38 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1948), where
disannexation was not sought until more than twenty years after incorporation, during
which taxes were paid on the particular tract.
31. See Brann v. Ocean Ridge, 38 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1949), affirmed without opinion.
Terrell, J., dissenting, expressed the opinion that bondholders who purchased at a discount
of 80% must have known that there was a deficiency of security, or, at least, that this
was a question of fact requiring trial. Bill to enjoin collection of taxes, dismissed on motion.
32. Allen v. Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949). The City of Largo was found to be
unconstitutionally organized. Actual improvements were made. The act was one to
enjoin collection of taxes on lands not benefited, and therefore is properly treated as one
for exoneration.
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constitutional question. By refusing to entertain a collateral attack on the
constitutionality ofthe corporation, courts are able to give effect to acts which
have been done and to provide for the collection of municipal indebtedness. s
It appears, however, that as between several parcels of land, those which have
actually shared in the expenditures for which the indebtedness was incurred,
regardless of benefit, must exonerate those which have not.3 4
Powers. While the general rule is to construe the charter of a municipality
strictly, this rule is not allowed to prevent the exercise of power which is
clearly implied. Whether a municipal corporation having express power to
purchase an existing privately-owned bridge and to maintain it as a free
public bridge, has power to tear it down and rebuild it, was presented in a
recent case.36 The municipality had express power to rebuild all other bridges
in the area, none of which, however, had been acquired from private owners.
From this fact, the courtfound reason to imply the power.
Personnel. Several decisions are noted here relating to personnel of
municipal corporations, including counties. The basic problem in each case was
one of statutory interpretation and not of public law. A sheriff is not entitled
to fees for arrests made by salaried patrol officers, ambiguity being resolved
by use of the rule that fee statutes are strictly construed.s 6 A statute providing
that no person shall become a member of the police department who is over
35, supersedes inconsistent provisions in the city charter, if any, because of
the plenary power of the legislature over municipal corporations. 7 The
city council of Jacksonville may provide for a special attorney to advise it on
legislative and budgetary matters,36 such a position being properly classified
as one of employee, not officer, as used in the applicable statutes.
TAXATION. Tax sales. The fact that property has been assessed in the
wrong name is no defense to an action to quiet title brought by the holder of
a tax deed.3 9 Since all persons are charged by statute with notice that real
property is subject to assessment for taxes, the former owner cannot be heard
to say that he has been deprived of property in judicial proceedings without
notice. In principle, this case overrules a recent one 40 in which it was held, on
33. Brann v. Ocean Ridge, 38 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1949). The bondholders were made
parties defendant. The appeal was dismissed without opinion, and the holding is inferred
from the dissent.
34. In Allen v. Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949), the court expressed the opinion
that the bondholder could levy against that land actually benefited; but this is mere
dictum as the case presented a question of exoneration against other land rather than one
of responding to the bondholder.
35. Smith v. Ryan, 39 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1949). The bridge involved is the Seabreeze
Bridge crossing the Halifax River between Seabreeze on the peninsula and Holly Hill
and Daytona on the mainland.
36. Bradford v. Stoutamire, 38 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1948).
37. McGuire v. Robarts. 39 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1949).
38. Pace v. King, 38 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1949).
39. Sovereign Finance Co. v. Beach, 38 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1949). The decisioai was
rested in part upon the charter of the taxing municipality.
40. Whittington v. Davis, 159 Fla. 409, 32 So.2d 158 (1947).
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a writ to obtain possession following issue of the tax deed, that the former
owner could, on offering to indemnify the holder of the tax deed, assert his
ignorance of the assessment and sale. That case was criticized, 41 particularly
because of its effect upon titles; but it has not been overruled specifically, and
there is a notable lack of coordination in the precedents cited. If the foreclosure
proceeding has been lacking in elements of due process, or has failed to comply
with statutory requirements, that is another matter. 42
Foreclosure of tax liens. Since proceedings to foreclose a tax lien are
in ren, it is, as a general rule, improper to entertain counterclaims. This rule
may admit of an exception in a case where the taxing authority has actually
taken the property in such a way as to give the owner a right to compensation,
as the result of a current case.' 3 The circuit court dismissed the counter-
claim and then dismissed a bill in equity to enjoin the foreclosure. While
expressing the opinion that the court erred on both assignments, the Supreme
Court directed further proceedings to be had in the injunction case.
Tax liens on public property. Recent decisions have held that the legisla-
ture may waive the immunity from taxation of public lands; but where it
does so, collection must be by mandamus, and no lien can be acquired which
may later be asserted if the property passes into private hands.4" With these
cases before it, the Supreme Court was urged in an original proceeding in
mandamus to collect taxes on public land, that the land was worth less than
the taxes, and permission was requested to abandon the land.4' Both parties
agreeing, the court denied the motion for a peremptory writ; thus permitting
the obvious intent of the legislature to be defeated by stipulation of the parties.
Presumably the land will be sold for taxes, but if the title of the purchases
is ever challenged, this opinion of the court should not, because of its advisory
character, be regarded as a binding precedent.
Special assessments. The cost of local improvements may be assessed
specially against the land benefited thereby; but when improvements are not
local in character, a special assessment is improper. This rule was illustrated
41. See Note, 2 MIAi L, Q. 238 (1948).
42. The defendant may overcome the presumption of validity by proof of matters
showing fatal defects in the statutes or proceedings to vitiate the tax deed. See Sovereign
Finance Co. v. Beach, 38 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla. 1949).
43. Baylen Street Wharf Co. v. Pensacola, 39 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1949). The city sought
to foreclose a lien for taxes on submerged land over which the defendant maintained
a mooring place for fishing vessels, adjacent to its boat shed and bulkhead. The defendant
claimed that the city had constructed a storm sewer which discharged silt and refuse
thereon, rendering the anchorage less useful. The court ruled that the defendant should
have an opportunity to prove these allegations, because, if he was dispossessed, the land
would not be taxable. It would then be burdened by the public easement of navigation,
which would exempt it.
44. Hunt v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 37 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1948), noted supra,
p. 281, and Watson v. Caldwell. 35 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1948), noted in Synopsis, 2 MtAsI
L. Q. 318, 319 (1948). Obviously there is an error in the text at p. 281, suora, where
"Supreme Court of Florida" has been substituted for "legislature."
45. State ex rel. Southern States Land & Timber Corp. v. Gladeview Drainage
Dist., 38 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1949).
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in a recent case 46 in which an existing street in a residential area was widened
to permit a diversion of arterial traffic from an overburdened thoroughfare
in the neighborhood. Such an improvement was in no sense local. If
property lies in a commercial zone where greater traffic would bring incidental
benefit, that fact may be reflected in the assessment of the property for
general taxes, but does not warrant a special assessment. There may be a
tendency to confuse the rule applicable to special assessments with that which
permits special benefit to be taken into consideration in condemnation cases.
It should not be necessary to bring a class suit to contest a special assessment,
since the effect of an illegal special assessment is to deprive the owner of his
property without due process of law; but the fact that a class suit is brought
is no ground for objection. 4
Miscellaneous taxts. A municipal charter authorizing license taxes on
occupations or privileges, does not authorize a tax on purcliaser of the
services of public utilities. 48 Power to levy an excise tax on sales includes the
power to make the vendor agent to collect the tax. 49 The State Road Depart-
ment is the sole judge of the way in which gasoline taxes will be spent tinder
a constitutional provision requiring 80% to be spent on state roads and bridges
within the county where the tax is collected. 0 The automobile license tax may
classify automobiles as "private" and "for hire." 51
LICENSES. Licensed monopolies. There is no question of the power of
the state to create licensed monopolies in fields which are subject to regulation
in the interest of public safety; but problems are raised when equal access
to the privilege of enjoying the monopoly are not accorded all persons. Thc
problem arose last quarter in connection with horse racing 512 and it has arisen
again this quarter in connection with liquor licenses.5 3 As long as the selective
process affords an equal opportunity to all applicants, constitutional limitations
are satisfied. To grant the license to the first applicant found to be qualified,
unless there is collusion in the matter of notice, would appear to be a
satisfactory solution of the problem.6 4 The circuit court was asked to say that
a citv acted arbitrarily in granting a liquor license to an applicant who had
46; Rafkin v. Miami Beach, 38 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1949).
47. Ibid.
48. Peninsular Telephone Co. v. Clearwater, 39 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1949). The city
was authorized by a statute to levy an excise tax not -to exceed 10% on services o
public utilities; but it sought to justify a levy of 15% by reference to its charter.
40. lbid.
50. Hodges v. Fernandina Port Authority, 38 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1949), construinj
LA tos. Art. IX, § 16.
51. Kilgore v. Motor Leasing Corp., 39 So.2d 69 (Fla, 1049), construing FLA. CONST
Art. iX. § 13.
5-'. Ilialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park, 37 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1948), noted supra
p. 24).
53. Coral Gables v. State ex reI Hassentenfel, 38 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1949).
54. The liaklah case could have been supported on this principle, since the preferre
track was the first. to be constructed and licensed; but subsequent increases in th
privileges of the licensee were the actual basis for objection.
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not yet constructed a place of business and refusing it to an applicant, filing
within twenty-four hours of the first, who did have such a place; but the
Supreme Court, reversing an order granting mandamus, was not persuaded.
Miscellaneous cases. Several cases are noted here in which licensing
statutes have been construed, but basic problems in public law were not in-
volved. On a proper resolution of an apparent conflict between a special and
general law, the City of Sarasota was found to have power to license plumbers
without examination where the applicant was already licensed in some other
city or state.65 The intent of the legislature being to exempt common carriers
from regulation by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission only where
subject to complete regulation by one or more municipalities, a bus line
serving an area wholly without any such municipality, and not merely passing
through such an area incidental to service within regulating municipalities,
is not within the exemption.56 The license tax on automobiles being primarily
for revenue and not for regulation, vehicles rented to a single lessee under
a contract to maintain delivery trucks for a dairy, were taxable as "for hire"
although the rental service could not be considered a common carrier.57
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. Limitations. The statute which limits
prosecution of all crimes not punishable by death to two years, provides that
where an indictment has been found or an information filed within two
years, further indictments may be found or informations filed within three
months of any order quashing the original indictment or information. This
provision was construed in a current case 18 in which the information was
filed more than two years after the offense was alleged to have been committed.
It was quashed because of the statute of limitations. An amended information
was filed more than three months later, alleging that prosecution was begun by
filing an affidavit and issuing a warrant before a justice of the peace within
two years. The supreme court affirned an order quashing the amended in-
formation because it was not filed within ninety days after the original informa-
tion was quashed. That provision of the statute was actually inapplicable,
because the original information was not filed within two years. This may be
regarded therefore as a holding that the filing of an information or the finding
of an indictment is necessary to avoid the limitation of tle statute: preliminary
proceedings do not suffice.
Appeals. Where an appeal is taken before judgment and sentence is
entered, the supreme court has no jurisdiction to hear it. The defect is so
55. Atwater v. Sarasota, 38 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1949).
56. State ex rel. Miami Beach v. Carter, 39 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1949). The proposed
line ran from Haulover Beach Park, not within the corporate limits of any municipal
corporation, to Hialeah and Miami Springs, traversing several incorporated and
unincorporated areas.
57. Kilgore v. Motor Leasing Corp., 39 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1949).
58. State v. Korowitz, 39 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1949).
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fundamental, according to a recent case,59 that even where judgment and
snlence have meanwhile been entered, the court must dismiss the appeal.
Inflammatory remarks made by the state's attorney cannot be assigned in
error unless objection is made thereto in the trial court and unless the remarks
are authenticated by the trial court.' 0 When a case is reviewed on habeas
corpus, matter discussed in the application becomes res adjudicata when the
writ is denied.61
JolIN G. STEPHENSON, III PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
59. Wells v. State, 38 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949). Three defendants were tried jointly of
larceny. An appeal was entered for all three when the trial court entered final judgment
and passed sentence on two of them, delaying action on the third until a week later. It
does not appear whether the time for appeal had expired as to the one whose appeal was
thus dismissed; but that is a fair inference.
60. Mendez v. State, 39 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1949).
61. Pope v. Mayo, 39 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1949).
